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THE LIBRARIAN ARCHIVES:

13 September 2001:
YOO-HOO! PTSC! About those copyrights PART 1
YOO-HOO! PTSC! About those copyrights PART 2
YOO-HOO! PTSC! About those copyrights PART 3
YOO-HOO! PTSC! About those copyrights PART 4

22 August 2001:
Re: Attention Librarian


5 March 2001:
Re: Question for CL or Librarian


10 April 2000:
Part 1, 1972-1973 FIX AND REPOST
Part 1, 1972-1973 FIX AND REPOST (Continued)
Part 2, 1974-1975 FIX AND REPOST
Part 2, 1974-1975 FIX AND REPOST (Continued)
Part 3, 1976-A FIX AND REPOST
Part 4, 1976-B FIX AND REPOST
Part 5, 1977 FIX AND REPOST
Part 6, 1978 FIX AND REPOST
Part 7, 1979-1980 FIX AND REPOST
Part 8, 1981-1982 FIX AND REPOST
Re: Owen, We Have a Problem

3 March 2000:
Re Part 3, 1976-A

25 February 2000:
PGPed Where the heck have *I* been? From 1972 to 1982 and back!

17 January 1999:
THE LIBRARIAN AND THE LIVING DEAD

8 December 1998:
Re: Urgent to Veritas: Marie

18 November 1998:
LIEBERMAN AND THE LIBRARIAN, PART I
LIEBERMAN AND THE LIBRARIAN, PART II
LIEBERMAN AND THE LIBRARIAN, PART III
LIEBERMAN AND THE LIBRARIAN, PART I—CORRECTED

8 October 1998:
A Message and Picture From The ARSCC Librarian

9 April 1998:
ZED'S "DEAR LIBRARIAN" LETTER

4 March 1998:
ZED, HONEY, I'VE GOT WHAT YOU NEED!
Re: The Missing Ten Months


13 January 1998:
THE LIBRARIAN LOSES IT WITH SHERIFF RON

5 January 1998:
Re: ENTHETA.NET archive: The Librarian
Re: Librarian: riddle me this.....

4 January 1998:
Re: Challenge to Critics and Scientologists Alike
LIBRARIAN CALLING JETA!

30 December 1997:
THE LIBRARIAN'S PRESENT TO LITIGANTS

29 December 1997:
THE LIBRARIAN HAS PRESENTS!
PRESENT TO BOOKBUYERS
PRESENT FOR WILLIAM BARWELL
PRESENT FOR RON'S AMIGO
PRESENT FOR JUSTIN

22 December 1997:
LOOK WHAT YOUR LITTLE OL' LIBRARIAN FOUND!

21 December 1997:
THE LIBRARIAN SAYS *NOT* RECOMMENDED READING!

19 December 1997:
jf05353-A THANK-YOU CARD FROM THE LIBRARIAN
ZED STRUGGLES WITH THE LIBRARIAN
SHERIFF RON INTERROGATES THE LIBRARIAN
THE SHERIFF COMES BACK FOR MORE
RE: ZED STRUGGLES WITH THE LIBRARIAN--NOT!
ZED AND THE SHERIFF GANG UP ON THE LIBRARIAN

17 December 1997:
ZED VS. THE LIBRARIAN-1
ZED VS. THE LIBRARIAN-2
ZED VS. THE LIBRARIAN-3
ZED VS. THE LIBRARIAN-4
ZED VS. THE LIBRARIAN-5
ZED VS. THE LIBRARIAN-6
ZED VS. THE LIBRARIAN-7

15 December 1997:
Challenge to Critics and Scientologists Alike

11 December 1997:
Re: Scientology/IRS Connection


RELATED FILES:

Public Research Foundation Press Release: "HIDDEN TIES BETWEEN IRS AND SCIENTOLOGY REVEALED"

The CST LEGAL PAPERS series


PUBLIC NOTICE:
The files on this site were found in publically available usenet archives and are in the public domain.

13 April 2000:
CST Legal Papers 13 Mitchell vs. CST Appeal


Date: 13 Apr 2000 08:58:43 -0000
From: Anonymous-Remailer@See.Comment.Header (Legal Archives)
Subject: CST Legal Papers 13 Mitchell vs. CST Appeal
Newsgroups: alt.religion.scientology
Message-ID: <39B54490AB8@127.0.0.1>

NOTES:

1. This is an Appeal filed on 3 March 2000 in the Court of Appeals for
the Second District of California. It is appealing the dismissal of a
libel suit that had been earlier filed by Stephen Mitchell and
Kathleen Carey against the CORPORATION known as "Church of Spiritual
Technology" (CST), doing business as (dba) "L. Ron Hubbard Library."
This appeal was posted to the internet anonymously.

2. The Appeal refers repeatedly to a "Clerk's Transcript" (CT), and
references numerous documents apparently included as part of, or
appended to, the CT (e.g., "see CT page 000158"). It is believed that
these references are all to documents that were part of the original
libel suit record, but these documents are not currently available.

3. A web site known as "Veritas" was, at one time, posting documents
from the original suit, so some of the referenced documents may be on
that site. Veritas can be found at:

http://www.clever.net/webwerks/veritas/index.htm

Veritas seemed to stop keeping up with the case at some point.
Hopefully, they or somebody will pick up the story with the Appeal
being filed, and will web the referenced documents. (Veritas also has
many other documents and records and facts regarding CST for anyone
who is interested in learning more.)

Here is the Appeal:

=====================================================================

STAMP:
================================
CLERK'S OFFICE
COURT OF APPEAL--SECOND DISTRICT
RECEIVED

MAR -3 2000

JOSEPH A. LANE Clerk
================================

Stephen Mitchell
c/o 12400 Ventura Blvd. #137
Studio City, California
818-789-6403

Kathleen Carey
c/o 5152 Sepulveda, Suite 205
Sherman Oaks, California
818-789-0954

Stephen Mitchell, Kathleen Carey
In propria persona [NOT PRO SE]

California Court of Appeal
Second Appellate District

Stephen Mitchell; Kathleen Carey             )
Appellants/Plaintiffs,                       )
                                             )
vs.                                          )
                                             )
CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY,              )
a corporation, dba L. Ron Hubbard Library;   )
Respondents/Defendants.                      )
_____________________________________________)

2 Civil 131378

Appeal from superior court,
Los Angeles county
Case No. BC175367
Frances Rothschild, judge

Real Party In Interest:
Church of Spiritual Technology

Opening Brief
Oral Argument Requested

Appeal after Dismissal

This appeal is brought to seek relief and remedy from an abuse of
judicial discretion and judicial bias against Us, both individually
and as a class as nationals. The trial court refused to recuse itself
after personally hearing the plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify, in
violation of CCP 170.3(c)(5). All of the trial court's subsequent
rulings demonstrated a personal agenda on it's part to deny the
recognition of Our status, our venue, Our rights under the Statutes of
California as well as due process in this civil litigation.
Furthermore, the trial court practiced law from the bench by advising
the Defendant CST on how to seek relief from default and, at times,
would find for the Defendant CST in absence of any argument or
evidence to controvert the evidence and law submitted to the trial
court by Us, thereby advocating for a defendant who would not or could
not advocate for themselves. Ultimately, the trial court issued a
judgment of dismissal as a sanction for a discovery controversy that
it, itself, helped to create.

Preliminary Statement

This civil action stems from the fact that We discovered that the
Church of Scientology had been infiltrated and subjected to a silent
"coup d'etat" by men wishing to do away with Scientology yet maintain
the perception of its continued existence.

New corporations, and particularly one founded by Meade Emory who was
formerly the Assistant to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
Service during the years 1975-1977, were formed to facilitate the
"gutting" of Scientology texts (Hubbard Communication Office
Bulletins) and policies (Hubbard Communication Office Policy Letters)
and the implementation of an overlay of new policies (known as
Scientology Policy Directives).

Furthermore, these new corporations removed books written by L. Ron
Hubbard from the marketplace and replaced them with books that
masquerade as L. Ron Hubbard writings. Per the genuine policies within
Scientology (HCOPLs), these actions constitute "HIGH CRIMES", the
penalties for which would be permanent exclusion from the Church. But
since these acts were carried out at the highest level of management
and in a covert manner designed to avoid public perception, they went
largely unnoticed.

We did, however, take notice and began writing reports to the Ethics
Division of the Church in an attempt to correct the ongoing policy
violations that We were witnessing.

In response to these numerous written reports, the Church of
Scientology--now under the control of the Church of Spiritual
Technology, dba L. Ron Hubbard Library (founded by Meade Emory of the
Internal Revenue Service)--issued written statements through the mail
labeling Us as criminals and using copyrighted photographs displaying
Our likenesses without permission. We believe that this was an act of
desperation to discredit Us and to avoid public awareness of the fraud
that was being committed each time Scientology texts bearing the
copyright "L. Ron Hubbard Library" were sold to the public.

For example, the book "Scientology: A New Slant on Life" by L. Ron
Hubbard, previously bearing the copyright "L. Ron Hubbard", has been
rewritten by Church staff members and reissued with a new ISBN number
and the copyright "L. Ron Hubbard Library". The new title is
"Scientology: A New Slant on Life by L. Ron Hubbard" giving the
appearance of being the original book. However, notice that the words
"by L. Ron Hubbard" have now been incorporated into the title and do
not constitute an attribution. The new and different nature of the
reissues is confirmed by copyright and Library of Congress documents.
We believe that this subterfuge is intentionally fraudulent as We are
informed and believe that the rank and file Scientologist would not
spend money on "Scientology" books were it to be disclosed that they
were not, in fact, written by L. Ron Hubbard, but rather by employees
of Meade Emory's corporation or licensees thereof. Therefore, the
value of these new products relies on the public perception that they
were, in fact, written by L. Ron Hubbard and not employees of a
former-IRS official. We Believe that the libel alleged in Our lawsuit
was undertaken to protect the parties responsible for creating a fraud
involving millions of dollars. We therefore have alleged that the
libel was undertaken with actual malice towards Us and in complete
disregard for the facts.

The Trial Court Violated the Law With Regard to the motion to
Disqualify

We filed a Motion to Disqualify (see Clerk's Transcript [hereinafter
CT] page 000156) on November 12, 1997. The motion was supported by a
verified statement of challenge (see CT page 000158). The motion to
Disqualify specifically alleged that by its actions taken on November
4, 1997 in Department 28 of L. A. superior court, the trial court
demonstrated that it was prejudiced against Us (see CT page 000157,
lines 2-4). The verified challenge specifically alleged prejudice
against Us.

CCP [Section]170.1(a)(6)(C) expressly states, "Bias or prejudice
towards a lawyer in the proceeding may be grounds for
disqualification." This would, of course, also apply to Us as
plaintiffs in propria persona.

CCP [Section]170.3(c)(1) states in pertinent part, "The statement
shall be presented at the earliest practicable opportunity after
discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification."
The "earliest practicable opportunity" came eight (8) days after our
first appearance before the trial court for a status conference on
November 4, 1997. Yet, the court denied the Motion to Disqualify as
being "untimely" (see CT page 000167, 14).

It can clearly be seen in the content and context of the Motion to
Disqualify (see CT page 000156-000157) that it was a disqualification
for cause. The fact that We mis-titled it as a "peremptory challenge"
rather than a "disqualification for cause" does not change the context
of the motion, nor that prejudice and bias as cause was alleged.

When the transcript for that hearing is reviewed (see RT pages
0010-0018), even the oral argument makes it clear that Our intention
was a disqualification for cause. Yet the trial court took advantage
of Our inadvertent error and characterized it as 170.6 instead of "for
cause" so it could be denied as untimely rather than being dealt with
according to CCP [Section]170.3(c)(5), which states:

"No judge who refuses to recuse himself or herself shall pass upon his
or her own disqualification or upon the sufficiency in law, fact, or
otherwise, of the statement of disqualification filed by a party. In
every such case, the question of disqualification shall be heard and
determined by another judge agreed upon by all the parties who have
appeared or, in the event they are unable to agree within five days of
notification of the judge's answer, by a judge selected by the
chairperson of the Judicial Counsel... ."

Notwithstanding the express procedural provisions of CCP
[Section]170.3, the trial court violated the law by ruling on the
motion itself rather than allowing another judge to decide on the
disqualification.

We are aware that per CCP 170.3(d) a writ of mandamus is the exclusive
remedy for a disqualification controversy. If Our Motion to Disqualify
had been properly heard by another judge and still subsequently
denied, We would agree that the remedy would have been by writ of
mandamus only. But in this case, where the content and context of the
Motion to Disqualify makes it clear that it is meant to be a
"disqualification for cause", the trial court was bound by CCP
170.3(d) to refer the matter for hearing to another judge so that the
allegation of prejudice and bias could be objectively addressed. Case
law such as Guadalia v. Superior Court, 211 Cal.App. 3d 1156, and
People v. Jenkins, 196 Cal.App. 3d 394, certainly do not expressly
deal with this exact scenario, so it leaves it to this Court to decide
as to whether this circumstance warrants a different look in light of
the trial court's actual violation of law rather than merely
questionable judicial discretion that should have been dealt with by
writ of mandamus within the 10 day limit.

Based upon the trial court's noncompliance with the express and
unambiguous provisions of CCP 170.3(d), We now argue that each and
every order and ruling issued by the trial court on or subsequent to
November 12, 1997 must be disregarded as null and void.

The balance of this opening Brief will disclose the evidence contained
in the Record on Appeal that demonstrates that We were correct in
interpreting that the trial court was specifically prejudiced against
Us and consistently made rulings from November 12, 1997 up to and
through March 8, 1999, that embodied that clear prejudice against Us.

The following issues are presented as evidence of the trial court's
motivation to ignore the allegation of prejudice contained in the
Motion to Disqualify in order to deny it as untimely, so as to be able
to remain in charge of the case and manipulate a conclusion adverse to
Us.

If this Court does not reverse the dismissal based upon the
disqualification issue itself, we ask that the following issues be
considered by this court as reversible errors in and of themselves,
individually or collectively.

The Trial Court Failed to Acknowledge and
Clarify the Venue of the Courtroom

The district court was changed to the superior court, effective
February 4, 1880, by Stats 1880, ch. 4, Section 2, which states in
pertinent part:

"Sec. 2. The Superior Court of each county in this State shall, <<for
all purposes,>> be considered the successor of the District, county,
and Probate Courts thereof... ." [emphasis added]

The balance of this Act of the legislature makes it very clear that
"for all purposes" included the venue and jurisdiction of the formerly
named district court.

On the face of the original verified complaint (see CT page 000001),
We expressly stated by means of footnote #1 that it was Our intention
that the complaint be heard in a venue that was "concurrent and
equivalent to the district court as created in the Constitution of the
State of California of 1849... ". Additionally, We stated, as
plaintiffs, that We were "living on the land in Los Angeles county, in
California, one of the United States of America;" (see CT page 000002,
lines 2-4).

We are informed and believe that in the course of common events within
the court system, when plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) are mere
fictional "persons", whether they be natural, corporate or otherwise,
that the superior court deals with them within its own fictional
venue. We therefore, as a matter course, deemed it appropriate to seek
assurance from the court that it was properly joining Us in the venue
We specified.

On November 4, 1997, We requested, for the record, a clarification of
the venue of the courtroom. What we received, for the record (see
Reporter's Transcript [hereinafter "RT"] page 0004, line 15 through
0005, line 4), from the trial court was silence on the issue, and its
express refusal to clarify the venue. The transcript for November 4,
1997 makes it very clear that the trial court was expressly avoiding
the lawful venue within which We intended to have Our case heard. The
United States Supreme Court has ruled that it is treason to the
constitution to refuse a rightful jurisdiction:

"We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which
is given us, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the constitution." Cohens  v. Virginia, 6
Wheat 264, 5 L.Ed. 257, 291.

Therefore, a question that this Court must address is whether a judge
elected to the bench of the superior court for Los Angeles county, on
the land within the boundaries of California, one of the united states
of America, has any lawful authority to refuse or decline that lawful
venue and usurp Our case into some fictional venue.

We are informed and believe that no judge has such authority. As
"nationals" of California, and each of Us being one of the people of
California, We do have standing to declare and demand the common law
venue that is "on the land" within the boundaries of California. The
trial court's refusal to acknowledge our venue is not only a
verification of its prejudice against Us as we have alleged herein,
but is an issue in and of itself worthy of reversal on appeal.

The Trial Court Ignored Perjury Within the
Substance of the Motion to Quash Service
Re: Defendant David Miscavige

A Motion to Quash Service of Summons was filed September 23, 1997 on
behalf of the Defendant David Miscavige. That motion was heard on
November 25, 1997 [1].

====================================================================
[1] The extraordinary amount of time between the filing of the motion
and the hearing date is due to the recusal of the originally assigned
judge (see CT, page 000120), for reasons unknown to us, and the
subsequent reassignment to the court to which this appeal applies.
====================================================================

The transcript for November 25, 1997 (see RT, pages 20-26) again
embodies the complete and express refusal by the trial court to
acknowledge the lawful venue on the land in Los Angeles county.

Our Opposition to Motion to Quash Service of Process, filed November
21, 1997 (see Augment to Clerk's Transcript pgs 1722-1726, submitted
March 1, 2000), contained information alleging perjury within the
substance of the Motion to Quash. The subsequent release of the
so-called "IRS Peace Treaty" or "Closing Agreement" pertaining to
Scientology (see CT pages 001224-001304) confirmed Our allegations of
perjury, not only on the part of David Miscavige, but personally on
the part of counsel Monique Yingling who appeared at the Motion to
Quash hearing on behalf of David Miscavige. Ms. Yingling is a
signatory to the "Peace Treaty", which confirms that the location of
service of process on David Miscavige was valid since it was served at
the same location designated in the IRS document as the location for
service of process for IRS notices to David Miscavige. The Motion to
Quash, prepared in part by Ms. Yingling, falsely asserted otherwise.
The trial court had a lawful duty to take notice of the allegations of
perjury. The Reporter's Transcript pages 0020-0026 demonstrates that
the trial court did not place any consideration upon Our opposition
papers whatsoever. We are not aware of any requirement for papers
opposing a motion to be accompanied by oral argument in order to be
considered.

The trial court's abuse of judicial discretion in refusing to place
due consideration on the allegations of perjury with regard to the
Motion to Quash Service of Summons is a verification of the court's
prejudice against Us as we have alleged herein, and is also an issue
in and of itself worthy of being given serious consideration by this
Court.

The Trial Court Gave Counsel for the Defendant
Instruction Re: How to Got the Default Vacated

The Defendant/respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY filed a motion
to Quash Service of Summons on January 21, 1998 (see CT pages
000171-000179). We filed an opposition to said motion on February 9,
1998 (see CT pages 000201-000207). The Defendant/respondent filed a
reply to our opposition on February 19, 1998 (see CT pages
000247-000250).

Default was entered as to Defendant/respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL
TECHNOLOGY on February 2, 1998 (see CT pages 000185-000191).

On February 9, 1996, Defendant/respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL
TECHNOLOGY filed an ex parte application to vacate default (see CT
pages 000208-000226).

Additionally We had filed a Request for Entry of Court Judgment (see
CT pages 000192-000200). The Defendant/respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL
TECHNOLOGY filed an opposition to the default judgment on February 17,
1998 (see CT pages 000227-000246).

On February 23, 1998, the trial court denied the
Defendant/Respondent's motion to vacate default (see CT page 000251).
The ruling stated, "The application of defendant Church of Spiritual
Technology (CST) to set aside default is denied...", but the ruling
did not stop there as it should have. The trial court went on to
"practice law" from the bench, counseling the defendant/respondent to
file a motion pursuant to CCP [Section]473. This is not only further
evidence of the trial court's prejudice against Us, but a willingness
to openly become an advocate for the defendant/respondent.

Then the trial court performs a very perplexing action. On the one
hand, it states that a demurrer having been sustained as to another
defendant did not relieve Defendant/respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL
TECHNOLOGY of its obligation to answer the complaint. Yet on the other
hand, in the same minute order, denies the Entry of Default Judgment
based upon the complaint having had a demurrer sustained as to another
defendant (see CT page 000251).

The trial court's abuse of judicial discretion in openly becoming an
advocate for the defendant/respondent is not only a verification of
the court's prejudice against Us as We have alleged herein, but is an
issue in and of itself worthy of a reversal by this Court.

The Trial Court Intentionally Misstated and/or
Mislead Us with Prejudicial Rulings

When the trial court sustained the demurrer as to Defendant MIKE
RINDER, it stated in its ruling, in pertinent part, that the
"...Plaintiffs must allege that they have not, in fact, violated the
tax laws of any State or of the United States of America." (see CT
page 000167). We did not amend the complaint as to Defendant MIKE
RINDER.

When the trial court sustained the demurrer as to Defendant/respondent
CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY on August 13, 1998 (see CT pages
000372-000374), it did not restate or reference the ruling from the
prior demurrer (see CT page 000167).

But when We did amend the complaint as to Defendant/respondent CHURCH
OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY (see CT pages 000379-000507), We did recall
the ruling on the first demurrer and took that ruling into
consideration. We did, in fact, state in the First Amended Verified
Complaint for Libel that:

"The Plaintiffs declare that they have not, in fact, violated the tax
laws of any of the several states or of the united States of America."
(see CT page 000398, lines 5-7).

When the trial court again sustained the demurrer of
Defendant/respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY on December 4,
1998, the ruling stated:

"The response of the Plaintiffs, when asked by the Court whether the
phrase "several states" and "united States" using a lower case "u"
have some meaning different from the "State of California" and the
"United States", made clear that Plaintiffs' reference to the tax laws
of the several states or the united States" [sic] is meant to describe
something other than the California Revenue and Taxation Code or the
Internal Revenue Code of the United States." (se [sic] CT page
001503).

Let us take an analytical look at the trial court's ruling of November
24, 1997 (CT p. 000167) as compared to the statement from the amended
complaint (see CT page 000398, lines 5-7). The trial court said
"...tax laws of any State or of the United States of America". Where
the trial court says "any State", what could that possibly mean if the
court is not referring to the same "several states" as used in Our
statement?

In the federal constitution, the words "several states" clearly refer
to the individual states joined as a union. On September 9, 1850,
pursuant to 9 Stat 452, Congress stated that "...the State of
California shall be, and is hereby declared to be one, of the United
States of America..."

When We used the words "several states", We were referring to the
State of California that is "one of the united states of America", and
any of the other 49 states that are all joined together in the union
known as the united states of America.

So when the trial court alleges that our use of the words "several
states" necessarily means something other than the State of
California, it raises a very important question: if, when the trial
court refers to the State of California, it is not referring to one of
the "several states", then what does the trial court mean by the words
"State of California"?

When We use the words "_u_nited States of America", We are referring
only to the union of the "several states". The use of the lower case
"u" is the manner in which those words were spelled in the Declaration
of Independence. Those words were spelled "_u_nited _s_tates of
America" in the original federal constitution. When they are spelled
with all initial caps, "_U_nited _S_tates of America", it can only be
construed as a spelling style change or a typographical error.

It must be noted that in the 11-24-97 minute order (CT 000167) the
trial [court] stated that "...Plaintiffs must allege that they have
not, in fact, violated the tax law of any State or of the United
States <<_of_America_>>". In the 12-04-98 minute order (CT 001502),
the trial court states "Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they
have not violated the tax laws of the states or of the United States".
"Of America" has disappeared. With regard to all the above, it is
significant when the "of America" is missing, since, for example, in
28 U.S.C. [Section]3002(15) (15) "United States" means--

* (A) a Federal corporation;

* (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other
  entity of the United States; or

* (C) an instrumentality of the United States.

The "corporate policy" of the federal government has no lawful
authority within the boundaries of one of the "several states".

The trial court's abuse of judicial discretion in openly playing with
the semantics of words and blatantly changing the court's position
based on those semantics, is not only a verification of the court's
prejudice against Us as We have alleged herein, but is an issue in and
of itself worthy of a reversal by this Court.

The Trial Court Manipulated a
Discovery Controversy

The Defendant/respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY filed a Motion
to Compel Production of Documents on August 11, 1998 (see CT pages
000511-000549). The demands were clearly overbroad and went beyond the
scope of the cause of action raised in the complaint.

Prior to the foregoing motion, one of the original plaintiffs, Lisa
Jan Precious, abandoned the case on or about July 31, 1998 (see CT
pages 000533-000536).

We, the remaining plaintiffs at that time, and the appellants now
seeking remedy, filed an Opposition to Defendant CST's Motion to
Compel Production of Documents on August 20, 1998 (see CT pages
000550-000574).

The Defendant/respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY filed a reply
to our opposition on August 25, 1998 (see CT pages 000575-000582).

The Motion to Compel was heard by the trial court on August 27, 1998
(see CT page 000583). The trial court granted the Motion to Compel
without acknowledging or taking any apparent consideration of Our
opposition whatsoever. We raised valid issues of law, that to this
very day, remain uncontroverted by either the Respondent or the trial
court (see CT pages 000553-000557). The fact that Our opposition was
not taken into consideration in any manner makes the imposition of
monetary sanctions particularly egregious.

On September 8, 1998, We filed an ex parte application for a Written
Statement of Decision Disclosing Lawful Foundation with regard to the
Minute order dated August 27, 1998 (see CT pages 000586-000602). The
ex parte application was denied without explanation (see CT page
000603). To this day, there is no record of any disclosure of lawful
foundation for the trial court's ruling on August 27, 1998. The trial
court appears to believe that it can do as is pleases and is not
required to disclose any lawful foundation for its actions.

On September 11, 1998, the Defendant/Respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL
TECHNOLOGY filed a demurrer.

Between September 25, 1998, and October 5, 1998, the
Defendant/Respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY filed a massive
volume of papers, the majority of it merely duplicating the existing
record (see CT pages 000678-000810). Within these pages are included
Our responses and oppositions to the Defendant/Respondent CHURCH OF
SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY's flurry of papers,

We do not wish to complicate this brief beyond what is necessary and
therefore We leave it to the discretion of this court to determine
what, if any, of the foregoing is relevant to the issues raised in
this appeal.

The key issue is to look at and analyze is [sic] the trial court's
Minute Order dated October 15, 1998 (see CT pages 000821-000823). We
hereby request that this Court take notice of the literally impossible
position that this prejudicial ruling placed on us as plaintiffs as
follows:

Minute order: 2)a) Demands 1 and 2: Plaintiffs' responses are
inadequate under CCP Section 2031(f)(2) (see CT page 000821 and CT
pages 000518-000519).

Our position: Any of these documents that may have existed were not in
Our possession, and the remainder simply do not exist. We cannot
produce documents that do not exist. For the trial court to dismiss as
a sanction for failure to follow this court order is extremely
prejudicial and biased.

Minute Order: 2(b) Demand 4: Plaintiffs' responses are inadequate (see
CT page 000821 and CT page 000519.

Our position: From the original Verified Complaint through and
including the last papers we filed in this matter, we have clearly
identified ourselves as being "nationals" pursuant to the Nationality
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137 [Section]101(a) and 8 U.S.C.
[Section]1101(a)(21). Neither the trial court nor the
Defendant/Respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY have ever
questioned or attempted to controvert this fact. It is a matter of law
that:

"...there is a <<citizenship of the United States>> [2] and a
<<citizenship of state>> [3], and the privileges and immunities of one
are not the same as the other <<is well established by the decisions
of the courts of this country.>> The leading cases upon the subjects
are those decided by the Supreme Court of the United States and
reported in 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394, and known as the
Slaughter-House Cases." (emphasis added), K. Tashiro et al. v. Jordan,
256 P. 545, 201 Cal. 239, 53 A.L.R. 1279, affirmed 49 S.Ct. 47, 278
U.S. 123, 73 L.Ed. 214, 14 C.J.S. Sec. 2, p.1131, N. 75 (1927)

=============================================================
[2] The "national of the United States", 54 Stat 137 [Section]101(b).
[3] The "national", 54 Stat 137 [Section]101(b).
=============================================================

Therefore, it is a matter of law that there are two distinct
classifications of citizenship in this country, with each having a
uniquely different set of "privileges and immunities". There is no
foundation of evidence of any kind within the Record on Appeal that
would establish that We are required by any law to have and maintain
such documentation. For the trial court to have ordered that we
produce documents which do not exist, creates a legal impossibility.
For the trial court to dismiss as a sanction for failure to follow a
court order which cannot be followed since no such documents exist, is
extremely prejudicial and biased.

Minute Order: 2) c) Demands 5, 6, 7, and 8: The Court previously
ordered Plaintiffs to respond without objection. Accordingly, they may
not now object on the grounds of relevance, Further, the fact that the
entities referred to are not parties to this action is of no import
(see CT pages 000821-000822 and CT page 000519).

Our position; Are We to believe that any and all "irrelevant" material
can be demanded on discovery and must be turned over without regard to
relevancy? The trial court cited no decisional law in support of the
order. Here again, it is a fact that there is no foundation in the
Record on Appeal demonstrating any evidence that the
Defendant/Respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY has any lawful
right to demand unlimited information with regard to entities that
have not been shown to have any relevant connection to the cause of
action.

For the trial court to dismiss as a sanction for failure to follow an
unlawful order is further evidence of the trial court's prejudice
against Us, and is therefore worthy of consideration by this Court for
reversal.

Minute order: 2)d) Demands 9 and 10: Plaintiffs' responses are
inadequate under CCP 2031(f)(2) (see CT page 000822 and CT page
000519).

Our position: We have no such documentation. The Record on Appeal is
devoid of any foundation to demonstrate any evidence that such
documents exist. For the trial court to dismiss as a sanction for
failing to produce documents that do not exist is further evidence of
the trial court's prejudice against us, and is therefore worthy of
consideration by this Court for reversal.

Minute Order: 2)e) Demands 11 through 15: Plaintiffs' responses are
inadequate under CCP 2031(f)(2) (see CT page 000822 and CT page
000519-000520).

Our position: What is the "Veritas movement" or "Public Research
Foundation"? We are not affiliated with nor do We have any knowledge
of any such "movement" or other organization. There has existed a
website entitled "Veritas" which was at one time brought to Our
attention. Apparently someone believes that this case deserved some
public attention and placed copies of court documents from this case
on that website. We did not post any documentation on the Internet. We
have not knowingly ever communicated with whomever might be
responsible for this website. The documents on that website are
publicly available to anyone who cares to obtain copies. Postings made
by others on the World Wide Web are outside of our responsibility and
control.

For the trial court to dismiss as a sanction, again for Our failure to
produce documents that do not exist, is clear evidence of the trial
court's prejudice against Us and is worthy of consideration by this
Court for reversal.

Minute Order: 2)f) Demands 16 and 17: The Court has previously Ordered
Plaintiffs to respond without objection. Further, no privilege exists
for the subject communication. (see CT page 000822 and CT page
000520).

Our position: No such written documentation exists. Any documentation
which might in some way fit these demands is already a part of the
record in this matter. We therefore have no such documentation subject
to a discovery demand.

For the trial court to dismiss as a sanction, again for our failure to
produce documents that do not exist, is clear evidence of the trial
court's prejudice against Us and is worthy of consideration by this
Court for reversal.

Minute Order: 2)g) Demands 18 and 19: Plaintiffs' responses are
inadequate under CCP 2031(f)(2) (see CT page 000822 and CT page
000519).

Our position: No such documentation exists. For the trial court to
dismiss as a sanction, again for Our failure to produce documents that
do not exist, is clear evidence of the trial court's prejudice against
Us and is worthy of consideration by this Court for reversal.

Minute Order: 2)h) Demand 20: Plaintiffs' responses are inadequate
under CCP 2031(f)(2) (see CT page 000822 and CT page 000519).

Our position: Again, as far as We are aware, no such documentation
exists. We have not gone about "documenting" each and every
communication We ever had concerning the issues raised in this matter.

For the trial court to dismiss as a sanction, again for our failure to
produce documents that do not exist, is clear evidence of the trial
court's prejudice against Us and is worthy of consideration by this
Court for reversal.

In summary, the Minute Order of October 15, 1998 attempted to place
impossible demands upon Us. We believe that this was an intentional
manipulation to create a circumstance where the trial court could make
it appear that We were refusing to cooperate with discovery to justify
a dismissal as sanction. We believe that this "discovery controversy"
was orchestrated by the trial court so as to justify a dispositive
sanction. In so doing, a finding based on the merits of the case (the
rights and immunities of the national vis-a-vis those of the national
of the United States) is neatly avoided.

Because of the impossible demands, We filed a Motion to Stay
Defendant's Discovery on October 29, 1998 (see CT 001169-001181). That
motion can be summed up by the statement made at a hearing on November
6, 1998 (see RT page 0083, lines 3-7) where it was stated:

"...therefore to allow discovery to take place prior to [the
Defendant/respondent] filing an answer would muddy the waters and make
it very difficult to adjudicate at the time of trial what facts were
in possession of the Defendant at the time this publication was
published and disseminated."

Having made the foregoing argument, the following then took place at
that same hearing just a few moments later (see RT page 0084, lines
4-8):

The Court. "...Now you have a motion to stay discovery that--had you
set that for some date?

Ms. Carey: December first.

The Court: Maybe we should take that off calendar because we really
have an agreement here."

It is now apparent that, due to Our inexperience in dealing with a
shrewd and manipulative judge, we quite naturally believed that "we
had an agreement" [meant] that the defendant/respondent's discovery
was put off until January 1999 as requested by Us in Our Motion to
Stay Discovery (see RT pages 0078-0086).

When the trial court issued its ruling on December 4, 1998 (see CT
pages 001502-001504), the dismissal as a sanction for noncompliance
with court orders of 8-27-98 and 10-15-98 came to Us as a shock,
having believed that We had "an agreement" that discovery was stayed
until after the court issued a ruling on the demurrer.

The Demurrer

For the trial court to sustain the demurrer of defendant/respondent
CST in this case is to construe out of existence the national. At no
time did the defendant/respondent CST controvert our evidence and
claims to that status and the trial court has been notably silent on
any issue pertaining to the rights and immunities of, or even the
venue and jurisdiction pertaining to, the national. For the trial
court to ignore the status of the national, along with the rights and
immunities pertaining to same, renders that status legally moot and
theoretical, thereby making the status of national of the United
States (per the 14th Amendment) the only legal possibility and not a
voluntary status in fact. For the trial court to take this view is a
violation of the 13th Amendment, seemingly with the intent of steering
every American into the indentured status of a national of the United
States in favor of that corporation's creditor(s). We hold that for
the status of the national of the United States to exist without
conflict with the 13th Amendment, the status of the national must be a
real, practicable and recognized status. The trial court's failure to
recognize, and deal with Us, as nationals in the absence of any
allegation, fact or evidence to the contrary is, in and of itself,
reversible error.

The Demurrer is Actually An Answer

"A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the allegations. It
does not test their truth, the plaintiff's ability to prove them or
the possible difficulty in making such proof." Saunders v. Superior
Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 832, at 840. Yet the demurrer of
defendant/respondent CST advocates vociferously on behalf of the
defendant/respondent, arguing against the allegations in Our Complaint
and addressing the causes of action point by point. The demurrer filed
by defendant/respondent CST does not, in fact, constitute a demurrer
but rather an answer which lacks evidence and facts and provides only
rhetoric and seemingly addresses a phantom complaint. Therefore, since
the demurrer was a demurrer in name only, it should not have been
sustained and this, in and of itself, should be considered reversible
error.

Conclusion

We believe that the Record on Appeal demonstrates that the trial court
assisted in manipulating the events to bring about the appearance of
the non-compliance with court orders in order to allege dismissal as a
sanction. We hold that this was done because the sustaining of the
demurrer alone was too weak to ensure that the case would ultimately
be suppressed.

We believe that the Record on Appeal also shows that the sustaining of
the demurrer was only possible as a result of the trial court's use of
twisted semantics and meanings of words rather than basing it upon a
valid lawful position (e.g., United States/United States of America).

Therefore both the sustaining of the demurrer, and the dismissal as a
sanction, were abuse of judicial discretion and embody an express
demonstration of prejudice and bias against Us without regard for the
facts in support of the cause of action and despite the fact that the
defendant/respondent never refuted or controverted the existence of
nationals or Our status as such.

The overwhelming consistency to the prejudice and bias against Us, in
and of itself, gives Us pause as to there being some definable motive
behind it all. Is it due to the trial court's need to protect a
self-interest related to involvement in legislation (see CT pages
000595-000597)? Or is it due to a realization by the trial court that
Meade Emory's interest in the reconfiguration of Scientology through
his corporation may not have been personal at all, but in fact was on
behalf of parties within or working in the interest of the United
States government [4] and that the trial court chose to protect those
interests?

===================================================================
[4] 20 C.J.S. [Section]1785 -- "The United States government is a
foreign corporation with respect to a state." In Re Merriam 36 N.E.
505,
141 N.Y. 479, affirmed 16 S.Ct. 1073, 183 U.S. 625, 41 L.Ed. 287
===================================================================

So, let us not forget that the trial court manipulated the content and
context of the Motion to Disqualify and violated CCP
[Section]170.3(c)(5) by ruling on the motion rather than passing it to
another judge as is required by CCP [Section]170.3(c)(5).

The dismissal as a sanction must be reversed. The sustaining of the
demurrer must be reversed and remanded back with instruction to order
the Defendant/Respondent CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY to answer the
complaint.

We would also request that this Court use its discretion with regard
to CCP [Section]170.1(c) and order that the matter be remanded to
Department 1 for reassignment to a superior court judge that is
capable of handling the case in an impartial manner as required by law
and judicial ethics.

Respectfully submitted this third day of the third month, in the year
A.D. two thousand.

_[L.S.]_______[signature]_____________seal_
Stephen Mitchell

_[L.S.]_______[signature]_____________seal_
Kathleen Carey


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